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Abstract
This paper investigates the eﬀect of a government expenditure shock on con-
sumption and real wages. I identify the shock by exploiting its pre-announced
nature, i.e. diﬀerent signs of the responses in investment, hours worked and
output during the announcement and after the realization of the shock. Since
pre-announcement leads to a non-stationary moving average representation, I es-
timate and identify a VMA model. The identifying restrictions are derived from
a DSGE model, which is estimated by matching the impulse response functions
of the VMA model. Private consumption is found to respond negatively during
the announcement period and positively after the realization. The reaction of
real wages is signiﬁcantly positive on impact, decreases during the announcement
horizon, and is again signiﬁcantly positive for two quarters after the realization.
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11 Introduction
What are the eﬀects of an innovation in government expenditure on the economy? It
still remains disputed whether private consumption and real wages rise or fall in re-
sponse. While economic theory supports both outcomes, empiricists have not yet been
able to discriminate between diﬀerent explanations, as the literature is divided over
the appropriate methodological approach. On the one hand, the narrative approach
identifying changes in government spending by military buildup dates in the US, pre-
dicts a decrease in consumption and real wages. On the other hand, the structural
Vector Autoregression (SVAR) approach identifying the shocks either with timing or
sign restriction, predicts the opposite.
In this paper I investigate the eﬀects of a government expenditure shock by employing
an SVAR model approach and identifying it via sign restriction as in Mountford and
Uhlig (2005) and Pappa (2005). Moreover, I explicitly model pre-announcement of
the ﬁscal policy shock and its consequences: the behavior of investment, GDP and
hours worked diﬀers during the announcement period and after the realization of the
shock1. By doing so, I ﬁrst avoid both criticism of the narrative approach - the potential
small sample problems, be it with one shock or a combination of many - and also
the ongoing discussion whether ‘abnormal’ ﬁscal policy episodes lead to ‘abnormal’ or
‘normal’ behavior of the economy.
Second, the approach set out in the paper also sidesteps the potential pitfalls of the
SVAR approach. In a recent paper, Ramey (2008) pointed out that the diﬀerent results
obtained by using this approach are simply due to a faulty timing assumption in the
SVAR literature which neglects or misses that changes in the government budget are
often pre-announced or known to the public beforehand. One recent example is The
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which announces government expen-
ditures from 1009 to 2012 with most spending taken place in 2010 and 2011. As I will
demonstrate in this paper, identifying the government expenditure shock by exploiting
the pre-announcement eﬀects explicitly, i.e. considering qualitative diﬀerences in the
response of investment during the pre-announcement period and after the realization
of the shock, overcomes the critique by Ramey.
When pursuing this approach another issue arises: the moving average representation of
the data generated by a pre-announced policy is potentially non-stable so that it cannot
be approximated by a VAR model2. Non-stability of the moving average representation
has two consequences: First, the information set of the agent in the economy is larger
than the information set of the econometrician: the agent has news about future,
pre-announced changes, which are not contained in the information set observed by
1The existence of those diﬀerences were found by House and Shapiro (2006) and Trabandt and
Uhlig (2006) among others.
2As pointed out ﬁrst by Hansen and Sargent (1991) and more recently by Leeper, Walker, and Yang
(2008).
2the econometrician. This news is discounted by the agent in a diﬀerent way than by
the econometrician. The econometrician estimates innovations as a discounted sum of
past news, where older news receives less weight than more recent. But, for an agent
yesterday’s news on pre-announced policy can be more relevant than today’s. One
challenge is therefore to align the information set of the econometrician with that of
the agent. In this paper I achieve this by using additional information taken from the
DSGE model. A second diﬃculty arises when attempting to estimate the non-stable
moving average process. One possibility, as laid out by Lippi and Reichlin (1993) and
Lippi and Reichlin (1994) is to ﬂip the unstable roots of the moving average process
into a stable region via Blaschke factors. Another way to proceed is to estimate the
moving average process with a Kalman Filter3. In this paper I therefore estimate the
Vector moving average representation.
Since there exists no common knowledge about the behavior of the macroeconomic
variables, I formally derive the sign restrictions from a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model. As DSGE model, I employ a model laid out by Gal´ ı, L´ opez-
Salido, and Vall´ es (2007). It is well suited to resolving the debate because it addresses
the arguments why the classic results should hold as well as the typical arguments why
the classic results fail: households which cannot smooth consumption, imperfect labor
markets and a certain degree of price stickiness. Depending on its parametrization, for
example the fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers and the degree of price stickiness, the
model features several classic or Keynesian characteristics. In the limit, i.e. with no
rule-of-thumb consumers and ﬁrms allowed to reset prices each period, it boils down
to a neoclassical model. To what extend those components inﬂuence the variables of
interest and the resulting sign restrictions for the VMA model depends on a small
number of structural parameters. The parameters of the DSGE model are estimated
jointly.
The results for a three-quarter pre-announced increase in government expenditures show
strong qualitative diﬀerences during the announcement period and after the realization
of the shock: output and hours worked respond negatively during the announcement
period and positively afterwards; investment responds negatively one additional quarter
before responding positively. Private consumption mimics this behavior and shows a
stable, slightly negative response during the announcement period followed by a signif-
icant positive response after the realization of the shock. Real wages react signiﬁcantly
positively on impact, decrease (and even become negative) during the announcement
horizon and react signiﬁcantly positively for two quarters after the realization.
The paper is organized in the following way: the next section summarizes the related
literature. In section 3 I lay out the econometric strategy. The DSGE model used to
derive the sign restrictions is described in section 4. The results are summarized in
section 5. Section 6 concludes.
3This is shown by Eric Leeper on slides available on his webpage. Appendix A.5 summarizes his
insights to keep the paper self-explanatory.
32 Related literature
In this section I ﬁrst shortly review the theoretical work on the eﬀects of a government
expenditure shock before I discuss the existing empirical approaches and ﬁndings in
more detail.
The evolution of the literature on the eﬀects of a government expenditure shock can be
summarized in the following way: starting out from a neoclassic growth model, which is
step by step extended with market imperfections and nominal rigidities, an ultra New
Keynesian model (as Ramey called it) evolved. The ﬁrst neoclassic attempts to study
the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy date back to Hall (1980) and Barro (Barro (1981) and Barro
(1987)). Building upon this work, Aiyagari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1990) and
Baxter and King (1993) expand a neoclassical growth model of a government sector. In
these models, an increase in government expenditure creates a negative wealth eﬀect for
the household, which will reduce consumption and increase labor supply. The increased
labor supply induces real wages to decrease and interest rates to increase.
Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) and Devereux, Head, and Lapham (1996) introduced
market imperfections, increasing returns to scale as well as monopolistic and oligopolis-
tic competition respectively into the neoclassic growth model. In their models, a govern-
ment spending shock, or a general demand shock, increases demand for goods, thereby
labor demand and thus real wages. In a recent paper, Gal´ ı, L´ opez-Salido, and Vall´ es
(2007) extend the New Keynesian model with rule-of-thumb consumers, who neither
borrow nor save, only consume the disposable income each period. Since those house-
holds do not feel intertemporally poorer, they do not decrease consumption as a response
to a positive government expenditure shock. Confronted with this large number of com-
peting models, empiricists have tried to discriminate between them by investigating the
response of real wages and private consumption after a change in government spending.
Findings in existing empirical studies are twofold depending on the identiﬁcation scheme
of the government expenditure shock. Ramey and Shapiro (1998) use a narrative ap-
proach to identify the VAR model. They interpret times of large military buildups in the
US, the Korean war, the Vietnam war and the Carter-Reagan buildup, as sudden and
unforseen increases in government expenditure. The resulting reactions of macroeco-
nomic variables to these events are thus interpreted as deviations from normal behavior.
They ﬁnd that output and hours rise, while consumption and real wages fall. Burnside,
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004) employ a similar methodology to estimate the impulse
responses of macroeconomic variables to a government expenditure shock and compare
them to impulse responses implied by a standard neoclassic model. The results indicate
that hours worked rise and investment brieﬂy increases, while real wages and consump-
tion decrease. Thus they conclude that the standard neoclassic model can account
reasonably well for the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy shocks. A similar conclusion is drawn
by Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), who modify a neoclassic growth model
distinguishing two types of capital, nonresidential and residential.
4A structural VAR approach is chosen by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) to identify a
government expenditure shock. They require ﬁscal policy variables not to respond
immediately to other innovations in the economy, i.e. they employ the recursiveness
assumption. Their ﬁndings corroborate the results of Ramey and Shapiro (1998) con-
cerning output and hours worked, but contradict their ﬁndings for consumption and
real wages. Mountford and Uhlig (2005) also use a structural VAR, but do not consider
any timing restriction. Instead, they employ sign restrictions to restrict the responses
of ﬁscal variables, while the responses of other macroeconomic variables are left open.
Besides the diﬀerent methodology, they additionally allow for a pre-announcement of
ﬁscal policy shocks. Indeed, as has been widely acknowledged and mentioned, most
ﬁscal policy shocks are pre-announced. Their ﬁndings, however, conﬁrm the results of
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) except for consumption, which only shows a weak positive
response.
The debate about the empirical evidence was reopened by Ramey (2008)4. Her paper
takes up two issues. First, she stresses the importance of the composition of government
expenditures. The dataset used by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) includes government
consumption as well as government investment expenditure. An increase in the latter
can be productive and potentially complement private consumption and investment so
that it might lead to a positive response in those variables. For these reasons Ramey
advocates using defense spending as a proxy for government expenditures in the VAR.
Second, she states that the ﬁndings of the studies diﬀer due to pre-announcement
eﬀects, implying that Blanchard and Perotti (2002) employ faulty timing to identify the
ﬁscal policy shock. In her paper, a neoclassic DSGE model including a pre-announced
government expenditure shock is set up and used to simulate artiﬁcial data. It is
then demonstrated that, if the pre-announcement of the shock is taken into account, a
negative response in consumption is estimated. If not, consumption appears to react
positively, a clearly misleading result.
In his summary and discussion of the recent literature, Perotti (2007) acknowledges the
concerns with respect to the structural VAR methodology. As a possible way of over-
coming its weaknesses he suggests employing annual data and distinguishing between
shocks to defense spending and to civilian government spending. However, using an-
nual data, the recursive assumption that the ﬁscal sector does not react contemporarily
to the state of the economy might not hold anymore. But, as Perotti mentions, the
narrative approach has considerable weaknesses of its own: First, it suﬀers from a small
sample size, second, it is not entirely clear whether the whole change in government
expenditure was announced at once or whether it was a combination of small changes,
i.e. whether there were numerous revisions of the military budget, occurring one after
the other, causing private consumption to respond multiple times.
In Ravn, Schmitt-Groh´ e, and Uribe (2007), the authors dismiss Ramey’s critique of
the usage of structural VAR models. They point out that shocks are by assumption
4The ﬁrst version dates back to 2006.
5orthogonal to the information set and consequently identify a structural VAR as in
Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
Pre-announced ﬁscal policy is considered in Mertens and Ravn (2009) and Tenhofen
and Wolﬀ (2007). The former authors address the issue of non-invertibility of the mov-
ing average representation by using a Vector Error Correction Model. The government
expenditure shock is then identiﬁed by a combination of long run and zero restrictions.
The latter authors augment the original VAR model by Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
with expectations and consider a one period pre-announcement only. This paper diﬀers
in two dimensions: ﬁrst by using sign restriction to identify the government expendi-
ture, putting less structure and fewer restrictions on the VAR model, and second by
estimating a VMA model to circumvent the issue of non-invertibility.
Besides the problem of non-invertibility of the moving average representation, Chung
and Leeper (2007) discuss the importance of the intertemporal government budget
constraint for a structural VAR analysis. In order to estimate reduced form shocks that
can be mapped into structural innovations, government debt and private investment
should be included in a VAR model.
Another important issue to take into account, as pointed out by Ramey (2008), is the
composition of government expenditure and what part is used in the estimation. Ab-
stracting from government transfers, government expenditure is deﬁned as the sum of
government investment expenditure and government consumption expenditure. Both
types have diﬀerent implications for the variables of interest. As described in Turnovsky
and Fisher (1995), an increase in government investment expenditure increases produc-
tivity and therefore private consumption and real wages. Including government invest-
ment expenditure in the analysis would therefore favor a Keynesian outcome, i.e. an
increase in both variables of interest and an adulteration of the analysis. Furthermore,
government consumption expenditure is quantitatively much more relevant (since the
1970s it has been about ﬁve times as large as government investment expenditure). I
will therefore employ government consumption expenditure when estimating the eﬀects
of an innovation in government expenditure.
3 Econometric strategy
Before describing the estimation methodology, I will discuss one note of caution when
estimating ﬁscal policy set out by Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2008).
63.1 The non-invertibility of the VMA model representation
and its consequences
Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2008) discuss the problem that private agents have fore-
sight about future ﬁscal policy, which the investigating econometrician does not have,
i.e. the information set of the private agent is larger than the information set of the
econometrician. This leads to the eﬀect, that agents discount news diﬀerently compared
to the econometrician. More precisely, the econometrician estimates innovations as a
discounted sum of old news where former news receives less weight. For the agent for-
mer news has a larger eﬀect on today’s variables due to pre-announcement. Secondly,
they show that whenever foresight about future ﬁscal variables is present the resulting
moving average representation of the data exhibits roots inside the unit circle. Conse-
quently, the moving average process is not invertible and cannot be approximated by
a VAR model. Furthermore, estimation of a moving average process with this kind of
long memory property proves to be very diﬃcult.
There exist two possibilities to address the latter issue: ﬂipping the roots of the moving
average process outside the unit circle by either applying a Blaschke-factor or a Kalman
Filter.5 I will employ the latter and thus obtain correct estimates of the reduced form
moving average coeﬃcients6. In order to recover the information set of the private agent
I will apply sign restrictions.
These restrictions are derived from impulse response functions of the DSGE model.
Two issues become crucial: the choice of the DSGE model and its parametrization.
As DSGE model I employ a model laid out by Gal´ ı, L´ opez-Salido, and Vall´ es (2007).
It is well suited to navigating through the debate because it addresses the arguments
why the classic results should hold as well as the typical arguments why the classic
results fail: households which cannot smooth consumption, imperfect labor markets
and a certain degree of price stickiness. Depending on its parametrization, for example
the fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers and the degree of price stickiness, the model
features several classic or Keynesian characteristics. In the limit, i.e. with no rule-
of-thumb consumers and ﬁrms allowed to reset prices each period, it boils down to
a neoclassical model. Therefore, as Figure 3 indicates, this DSGE model allows for
positive as well as negative responses in consumption and real wages. To what extend
these components inﬂuence the variables of interest and the resulting sign restrictions
for the VMA model depends on a small number of structural parameters, which have
to be estimated.
5Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2008) discuss both possibilities extensively. Blaschke factors are used
by Mertens and Ravn (2009).
6More algebraic details are given in appendix A.5.
73.2 Choice of the estimation methodology
The estimation methodology for the structural parameters of the DSGE model is chosen
on the following grounds: due to advances in computational power there are various
ways to estimate a DSGE model nowadays. However, procedures and results diﬀer
substantially depending on the econometric interpretation of the DSGE model. Geweke
(1999) distinguishes between a strong and a weak interpretation. The former requires
the DSGE model to provide a full description of the data generating process. Formally,
it has to exhibit as many structural shocks as the observable variables to be explained.
The DSGE model described above is clearly not intended to be a proper representation
of the data generating process7. One estimation strategy therefore is to extend the
DSGE model with additional structural shocks and several additional features and
frictions such as for example capacity utilization and a habit in consumption. This
is no such thing as a free lunch. This comes at the cost of a diluted analysis. The
result cannot be traced back to certain DSGE model components such as for example
the share of rule-of-thumb households and the degree of price stickiness, whose eﬀects
are to be investigated. Attempting to apply the strong econometric interpretation to
DSGE model without extensions results in biased estimation results.8 I therefore follow
the weak econometric interpretation of the DSGE model and do not assume that it is
a proper representation of the data generating process. It is estimated by matching
the impulse response functions of the DSGE model and a VMA model to a government
expenditure shock.
Thus, on the one hand the parameters of the DSGE model are estimated by matching
the corresponding impulse response functions of the VMA model. On the other hand,
the structural impulse response functions of the VMA model are identiﬁed by applying
sign restrictions which are derived from the DSGE model. Both distributions are there-
fore conditional distributions: they depend on a realization of the impulse response
function of the VMA model and on restrictions from the DSGE model, i.e. a realiza-
tion of a vector of structural parameters of the DSGE model and a realization of the
coeﬃcients of the VMA model, respectively. To take those dependencies into account
it is necessary to consider both, the impulse response functions of the VMA model and
of the DSGE model as stochastic and to characterize their joint distribution.
After I have set up the necessary notation, I will decompose the joint distribution of
the parameters of the DSGE model and the structural parameters of the VMA model,
show how they are connected and how they can be evaluated. The distribution of the
VMA model coeﬃcients conditional on restrictions derived from the DSGE model is
laid out in Appendix A.2 and the distribution of the parameters of the DSGE model
conditional on ϕV is described in Appendix A.3. The estimation methodology is an
application of the methodology laid out in Kriwoluzky (2009) and additional details
7As is pointed out by Gal´ ı, L´ opez-Salido, and Vall´ es (2007).
8In that case it is not possible to identify all structural parameters.
8and information can be found there.
3.3 Notation of the VMA model and the DSGE model
Let Yt be a m×1 vector at date t =1+l,...,T, ϕi be coeﬃcient matrices of size m×m
and   an i.i.d. one-step ahead forecast error, distributed:   ∼N(0,I m×m). The VMA






i  t−i. (1)
The impulse response function of a VMA model to an innovation in variable j at horizon
iϕ V
ik is given by the j-th column of the i-th coeﬃcient matrix.
Due to the assumption that Σ  = Im×m, this structural moving average representation
cannot be estimated directly. Instead, the reduced form moving average representation
with error term ut = A t, where u ∼N(0,Σ), is estimated. The reduced form moving






The factorization Σ = A A does not have a unique solution, which leads to an identi-
ﬁcation problem of A. The impulse matrix ˘ A is deﬁned as a sub matrix of A of size
m×n where n is the number of structural shocks under consideration, i.e. the structural
shock of interest as well as other shocks necessary to distinguish this shock.
The fundamental solution of the DSGE model is given by9:
ˆ xt = T(˜ θ)ˆ xt−1 + R(˜ θ)zt, (3)
where T(˜ θ) and R(˜ θ) are matrices one obtains after solving the DSGE model with
standard solution techniques. z is a vector collecting the structural shocks of the DSGE
model. z is assumed to be normally distributed with z ∼N(0,ΣDSGE).
The endogenous state variables of the DSGE model are related to the set of observable
variables y via an observation equation:
ˆ yt = Gˆ xt + Hwt (4)
where G and H denote matrices picking the corresponding endogenous states and mea-
surement errors w. w is assumed to be distributed w ∼N(0,ΣME).
9  xt denotes the percentage deviation of the generic variable xt from a deterministic steady state x
chosen as approximation point.
9The impulse response functions of the variables in x to a structural shock j at horizon
iϕ D




iR(˜ θ)zj,i =0 ,1,2,...K. (5)
The DSGE model is employed to estimate the structural impulse response functions of
the VMA model. This induces matching a given realization of the impulse response












i (˜ θ)+ωi (7)
with all vectors of dimension m∗k×1. The error term ωi has the property E[ωiω 
i]=Ω ωi.
The vector comprising the vector of deep parameters ˜ θ, the vectorized variance co-
variance matrices ΣME and ΣDSGE as well as the vectorized Ω is deﬁned as θ =
[ ˜ θ ΣDSGE vec(Ω) vec(ΣME) ] .
3.4 The joint posterior distribution
I describe the joint posterior distribution of the parameters of the DSGE model and of
the impulse response function of a VAR model based on the following considerations:
On the one hand, the parameters of the DSGE model are estimated by matching the
corresponding impulse response function of the VMA model. On the other hand, the
structural impulse response functions of the VMA model are identiﬁed by applying zero
and sign restrictions which are derived from the DSGE model. Both distributions are
therefore conditional distributions: they depend on a realization of the impulse response
function of the VMA model and on restrictions from the DSGE model, i.e. a realization
of a vector of structural parameters of the DSGE model, respectively. This section sets
out, how the conditional distributions can be combined to derive the joint distribution.
The joint posterior distribution of the vector of parameters of the DSGE model (θ) and
the coeﬃcients of the VMA model, ϕV, given a matrix with time series observations Y ,
p(θ,ϕV|Y ), can be decomposed in diﬀerent ways. In the case that the likelihood of the
VMA model impulse response functions depends on restrictions from the DSGE model,




Since the DSGE model is estimated by matching corresponding impulse response func-
tions, the coeﬃcients of the VMA model constitute a statistic suﬃcient for estimating
the parameters of the DSGE model, i.e. p(θ|ϕV,Y)=p(θ|ϕV). The joint posterior





10The framework presented in Kriwoluzky (2009) is based on the argument that both





and can be approximated suﬃciently well by Monte Carlo Markov Chain Methods 10.
4 The DSGE model
The DSGE model employed here was originally laid out by Gal´ ı, L´ opez-Salido, and
Vall´ es (2007). I relax the assumption of no initial debt in order to contrast the DSGE
model with the data. The DSGE model consists of two types of households, households
with access to government bond and capital markets and households without. Goods
are produced by perfectly competitive ﬁrms, using goods produced by intermediate
ﬁrms as inputs. Intermediate good ﬁrms are monopolistic competitors and subject to a
Calvo pricing mechanism, i.e. with a certain probability they receive a signal allowing
them to reset their price which they are not allowed to change otherwise. Intermediate
good ﬁrms have access to a production technology combining capital and labor. Labor
is supplied by labor unions.
The government consists of a monetary authority setting the nominal interest rate and
a ﬁscal authority issuing bonds and raising taxes. Government expenditure is modeled
as an exogenous process.
4.1 Households
The DSGE model exhibits a continuum of inﬁnitively lived households indexed by
i ∈ [0,1]. There exist two types of households, households optimizing intertemporally
and households which are not allowed to save. The latter are called rule-of-thumb
households. More precisely, they are not allowed to participate in the capital and
bonds goods market, an assumption made to reﬂect the fact that some households have
indeed only limited access to the credit market. The share of rule-of-thumb households
in the economy is given by λ.

















10Note that the conditional distributions of interest (p(θ|ϕV ) and p(ϕV |θ,Y)) are on diﬀerent sides
of the proportionality sign in (10). It is therefore possible to employ a Gibbs sampling algorithm. The
sampling algorithm is described in Appendix A.4.
11where β is the discount factor and ν a parameter measuring the disutility of labor. The
household buys government bonds B yielding the return R, invest io units in capital
goods ko yielding return Rk and receives dividends d from the ownership of ﬁrms. With




















t + dt. (12)
Capital accumulates according to:
k
o












where Φ denotes investment to capital adjustment costs. With respect to the adjust-
ment cost function the following assumptions are made: Φ(δ)=δ,Φ  (δ)=1 ,Φ   > 0,








  is deﬁned as: η ≡− 1
Φ  (δ)δ.

















Both types of households are assumed to consume the same amount of goods in the
steady state. This can be achieved through the appropriate choices of the lump sum
taxes tr and to. Aggregate variables, i.e. aggregate consumption c, labor n, capital k
and investment i are deﬁned as the weighted average of the corresponding variables of
the rule-of-thumb household and the intertemporally optimizing household:
ct = λc
r





t +( 1− λ)n
o
t (17)
it =( 1 − λ)i
o
t (18)




The economy contains two sectors. In one sector perfectly competitive ﬁrms produce
the ﬁnal good y using as inputs intermediate goods produced by monopolistically com-
petitive ﬁrms.
124.2.1 Final good ﬁrms
Final good ﬁrms have access to the following production function:
yt =





   p−1
 p
, (20)
where y(j) denotes the intermediate good produced by ﬁrm j and  p > 1 the elasticity


















4.2.2 Intermediate good ﬁrms





where α denotes the capital share in the production. Taking the real wage and capital























Intermediate good ﬁrms are subject to a Calvo pricing mechanism. Each period the
ﬁrm receives a price signal with probability ϑ. The intermediate ﬁrm is allowed to set






















The government sector consists of a monetary authority setting nominal interest rates
R and a ﬁscal authority setting lump sum taxes t and issuing nominal government
bonds B. The monetary authority follows the simple interest rate rule:
Rt = φpiπt. (28)








Since the ﬁscal authority can adjust bonds and lump sum taxes, an additional ﬁscal











As an additional friction, an imperfect labor market is assumed. The introduction of
wage-setting by unions leads to the outcome that the amount of labor supplied by the
households is equal across households, i.e. no
t = nr
t. A continuum of unions is assumed
representing a certain type of labor. Let  w denote the elasticity of substitution across
diﬀerent types of labor. Eﬀective labor input hired by ﬁrm j is then given by:
nt(j)=
   1
0
nt(j,i)di
   w
 w−1
. (31)
Assuming furthermore that the proportion of rule-of-thumb households is uniformly
distributed across households and therefore across unions, a typical union (z) sets the





























11¯ x denote steady state values.
144.5 Market clearing and equilibrium
The goods market clearing condition is given by:
yt = ct + it + gt. (34)
An equilibrium is deﬁned in the following way:
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium is an allocation {ct,n t,i t,k t,b t,y t} and a price system
{pt(j),p t,w t(z),w t,R k
t,R b
t} and an inﬂation rate πt such that for a monetary policy Rt
and ﬁscal policy tt, an initial price level p−1, initial values for k−1 and b−1 and given
an exogenous processes for government expenditure {gt}:





(11) subject to the budget constraint (12) and the capital accumulation equation
(13), given prices {wt,R k
t,R b
t} and proﬁts {dt};
ii for each rule-of-thumb household an allocation {cr
t,n r
t} maximizes (14) subject to









t +( 1− λ)n
o
t (36)
it =( 1 − λ)i
o
t (37)




iv the production allocation {yt(j),y t} and prices {pt,p t(j),R k
t,w t} solve the cost min-
imization problem of the ﬁnal good ﬁrms and the proﬁt maximization problem of
each intermediate ﬁrm j subject to the demand function (27) and technology (23);
v for each labor union z the allocation {nt,n t(z),c r
t(z),c o
t(z)} and prices {wt(z),w t}
maximize the pay-oﬀ function (32) subject to the demand for each labor union
(33);
vi the government budget constraint (29) is fulﬁlled;
vii markets are clear.
155 Results
5.1 Pre-announcement and timing – A Monte Carlo Study
In this section the DSGE model is calibrated to mimic the DSGE model employed by
Ramey (2008). I simulate artiﬁcial data from it and estimate a structural VAR model
with this dataset taking pre-announcement eﬀects into account.
In order to mimic the DSGE model laid out by Ramey, which is a neoclassical growth
model with government spending and non-distortionary taxes, the DSGE model from
section 4 is calibrated in the following way. The fraction of rule-of-thumb households is
set to 0 (λ = 0), the elasticity of the investment to capital ratio with respect to Tobin’s
q is set fairly high (η = 10), the probability of not optimizing prices is set very low
to mirror almost ﬂexible prices (ϑ =0 .05) and the elasticity of substitution between
intermediate goods is set to 1 (μp = 1). Remaining parameters are chosen similar to
Ramey, i.e. the discount factor β =0 .99, the depreciation rate δ =0 .025, the capital
share in production α =0 .33 and the parameter measuring the disutility of labor ν =1 .
The policy parameters of the ﬁscal and monetary authorities are set such as to ensure
uniqueness of the solution: φb =0 .3, φg =0 .1 and φπ =1 .5. The processes for actual
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Since I am going to estimate a VAR model with four variables, the DSGE model from
which the data is simulated has to incorporate at least this number of shocks. I therefore
augment the model with a preference shock to labor, a shock to total factor productivity
(as Ramey does) and a monetary policy shock (i.e. a shock to equation (28)).
The resulting impulse response function of the DSGE model to a shock in government
expenditure is plotted in Figure 1. It is very similar to the ﬁgure in Ramey (2008).
Note that investment ﬁrst reacts positively to the shock and becomes negative after-
wards. In order to provide evidence that making use of the pre-announced nature of a
government expenditure shock, i.e. restricting variables to respond diﬀerently during
the announcement of the shock and after realization ,can resolve the problem of ﬂawed
estimation approaches, I identify the government expenditure shock employing the fol-
lowing sign restrictions: government expenditure are assumed to be zero during the
ﬁrst period (pre-announcement period) and to be positive afterwards, hours worked are
assumed to respond positively and investment is restricted to respond positively during
the ﬁrst quarter and to respond negatively afterwards.12
12Note that I do not describe the joint distribution of the impulse response function of the DSGE
model and the VAR model. This is due to the fact that the sign restrictions are identical across a
reasonable parameter space of the DSGE model.
16The result of the Monte Carlo Experiment is shown in Figure 2. The response of
consumption is signiﬁcantly negative. This ﬁnding is robust with respect to a faulty
pre-announced period (one only instead of two) and whether the government expen-
diture shock is ordered ﬁrst or second. Given this encouraging result I will apply the
methodology to the data. This time, however, the sign restrictions will not be identical
across the parameter space of the DSGE model.
5.2 Data
I now apply the methodology to quarterly US data ranging from the ﬁrst quarter of
1948 to the third of 2007. The VMA model consists of seven variables: government
consumption expenditure, real GDP, private consumption, hours worked, private in-
vestment, real wages and real federal debt. The data was obtained from the internet,
mostly from NIPA and FRED. In appendix A.1 a detailed description of the exact
source can be found. In order to remove long term trends from the data I employ a HP
ﬁlter with a smoothing parameter equal to 1600.13
5.3 Speciﬁcation of the identifying restriction and the prior
distribution
I order the government expenditure shock similarly as in Mountford and Uhlig (2005)
to come second after a business cycle shock; output, real wages, private investment,
private consumption and hours worked are restricted to respond positively. By doing
so the business cycle shock is assumed to explain most of the variance of the variables
of the VMA model. The government expenditure shock is constructed to be orthogonal
to the business cycle shock, i.e. most of the potential co-movements will be removed.
The pre-announcement horizon is set to three quarters following the number suggested
by Yang (2007). All variables except private consumption and real wages are restricted
to exhibit the signs derived from the impulse response function of the DSGE model.
The sign is allowed to switch, i.e. it can diﬀer during the pre-announcement of the
shock and after its realization.
The mean of the prior distributions of the parameters of the DSGE model is speciﬁed
very closely to values used for calibration by Gal´ ı, L´ opez-Salido, and Vall´ es (2007). One
exception is the choice of η. In order to allow for a wider range of impulse responses,
the mean is set to 7. The standard deviations of the prior distribution are chosen to
ensure that the impulse response functions of the DSGE model cover a wide range of
possibilities as depicted in Figure 3. Not all parameters are estimated. The values used
to calibrate those parameters are taken entirely from Gal´ ı, L´ opez-Salido, and Vall´ es
13As suggested by Hodrick and Prescott (1997).
17(2007), except for the ratio of real debt to GDP which is set to
¯ b
¯ y =0 .6. Calibrated
parameters include: β =0 .99, δ =0 .025, α =1 /3,
¯ g
y =0 .2, φπ =1 .5 and μπ =1 .2.
5.4 Estimation Results
The smoothed Kalman ﬁlter maximum likelihood estimates of the VMA model variables
are depicted in Figure 4. The plot indicates that the time series is very well described
by the VMA model.
The impulse response functions of the VMA model are shown in Figure 5. The ﬁrst
subplot displays the announcement and the realization of the government consumption
expenditure shock: the ﬁrst three periods are restricted to zero followed by one positive
period. Afterwards, government expenditures fall and even become negative. Given
the fact that real debt responds positively over ﬁve quarters (even though the response
is restricted for four quarters only), the decline in government expenditure gives rise
to a policy rule in which government consumption expenditure reacts negatively on an
increase in real debt - as suggested among others by Leeper and Yang (2008), Bohn
(1991) and Corsetti, Meier, and M¨ uller (2009).
The responses of output and hours worked in Figure 5 display a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
qualitative behavior before and after the realization of the government consumption ex-
penditure shock. Both react negatively during the announcement horizon and strongly
positively after the realization of the shock. The response of private investment shows
similar behavior, but the sign of the response changes after four (not after the an-
nouncement horizon of three quarters) from negative to positive. This implies that the
restrictions derived from the DSGE model are negative over the complete restriction
horizon.
Summarizing the estimated sign restrictions from the DSGE model, it can be stated
that real debt is restricted to react positively over four periods, private investment to
react negatively, while output and hours worked are restricted to respond negatively
during the announcement period and positively after the realization.
These identifying restrictions imply the following results for private consumption and
real wages. Private consumption displays signiﬁcantly negative behavior throughout
the announcement period and a very strong positive response afterwards. Real wages
react signiﬁcantly positively on impact, decrease throughout the announcement period
and increase after the realization. During the ﬁfth and sixth period the response of real
wages is positive.
What is driving this result? One advantage of the methodology employed is that
the estimated impulse response functions of the VMA model can be interpreted in
economic terms by means of the DSGE model. Key for the interpretation are the
estimation results of the structural parameters of the DSGE model. Before I interpret
18the results, I present and discuss the estimation results of the structural parameters
and the corresponding impulse response function of the DSGE model.
The prior and posterior distribution is plotted in Figure 7. Table 1 gives an overview
of the characteristics of the prior and posterior distribution. The plot and the table
indicate that all parameters are well identiﬁed and that the estimates are within a
very reasonable range. The estimated share of rule-of-thumb consumers (0.36 at the
posterior mean) is in the range of the estimates obtained by Forni, Monteforte, and
Sessa (2009) in studies using European data: 0.34 − 0.37. The posterior mean of the
calvo parameter (ϑ =0 .74) is estimated slightly higher than in a recent study by Smets
and Wouters (2007), who estimated it at about (ϑ =0 .66). However, the relatively high
estimate of the price stickiness parameter is consistent with a characteristic of the DSGE
model pointed out by Furlanetto and Seneca (2009): the DSGE model employed obeys
many real frictions, which are present in the DSGE model of Smets and Wouters (2007).
Once those real rigidities were included, the resulting nominal frictions would have been
estimated at lower values. The posterior mean estimate of the elasticity of labor with
respect to wages (ν =0 .14) is in line with, though slightly lower than the estimates
obtained by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).
The value for the estimate of the elasticity of the investment to capital-capital ratio
with respect to Tobins‘s Q (η =4 .2) is higher than the value calibrated by Gal´ ı, L´ opez-
Salido, and Vall´ es (2007) (η = 1), implying less investment adjustment costs. Given
the response of government expenditure in Figure 5, the persistence of government
expenditure (ρg =0 .74) is lower than that calibrated by Gal´ ı, L´ opez-Salido, and Vall´ es
(2007) (ρg =0 .9). The elasticity of taxes with respect to government expenditure
(φg =0 .08) and the elasticity of taxes with respect to government debt (φb =0 .32) are
closely estimated to the values set by Gal´ ı, L´ opez-Salido, and Vall´ es (2007) ((φg =0 .1)
and φ=0.33).
A comparison of the impulse response functions of the DSGE model and the VMA
model is plotted in Figure 6. The impulse response functions of the VMA model are
well matched by those of the DSGE model. In particular, the movement of output,
hours worked, private consumption, and real wages (for some periods) are very well
matched by the DSGE model. Impulse response functions not matched very well in-
clude private investment, government consumption expenditure and real debt after they
become negative.
The impulse response of government consumption expenditure of the VMA model is
very well matched by the DSGE model up to the point where government consumption
expenditure becomes negative. Since the DSGE model employed in this analysis does
not feature a policy rule with spending reversals, the behavior of government consump-
tion expenditure after the shock cannot be matched by the impulse response function
of the DSGE model. A policy rule featuring government spending reversals would be
straightforward to implement. On the other hand, a modiﬁed policy rule would also
aﬀect other endogenous variables diﬀerently compared to the original DSGE model I
19want to consider. In order to be as transparent as possible on the choice of the DSGE
model and its consequences, I choose to abstain from modifying the DSGE model in
any dimension. A similar reasoning, i.e. a lack in the richness of the speciﬁcation of
the ﬁscal policy rules, applies to the response of real debt. Initially, the DSGE model
has a lower response of real debt, which increases over time, while the impulse response
function of the VMA model displays a strong initial positive response, which becomes
negative after ﬁve periods.
The impulse response of private investment displays the largest diﬀerence between the
VMA model and the DSGE model: the VMA model displays a strong negative response,
which becomes positive after the restriction horizon of four periods. Even though, the
adjustment costs of inﬂation are estimated more ﬂexibly than in the original calibration
by Gal´ ı, L´ opez-Salido, and Vall´ es (2007), the response of investment is less volatile in
the DSGE model than in the VMA model.
Most importantly, the impulse response functions of the DSGE model and the VMA
model, which are at the center of the analysis, correspond very well: ﬁrstly the variables
which display a qualitative diﬀerence between the announcement and the realization of
the shock, i.e. output and hours worked; and secondly the variables under inspection,
private consumption over the complete horizon and real wages except for the ﬁrst
period. Since the impulse responses correspond so well, the DSGE model can be used
to recover the mechanism behind the impulse responses of private consumption and real
wages. Key for the mechanism are the expectations formed by the ﬁrm sector. Figure
8 shows the impulse response functions of the nominal interest rate and inﬂation in
the DSGE model. Both responses rise after the pre-announcement of the shock. Firms
anticipate higher inﬂation after the realization of the shock and increase prices after
the announcement immediately. Monetary authorities increase nominal interest rates
as a response to the rise in inﬂation. The increase in prices leads to an initial drop
in GDP, hours worked, private consumption and investment. The result is stagﬂation
during the announcement. The increase in government expenditure leads then to a rise
in output, hours worked and private consumption for two reasons: a rise in income for
the share of rule-of-thumb households and a drop in prices due to the negative response
of output so far - prices overshoot.
5.5 Fiscal Multiplier and Variance decomposition
I compute two kinds of ﬁscal multipliers. The ﬁrst multiplier is deﬁned as the ratio of
the response of output divided by the change in government expenditure and scaled by
the average share of government consumption expenditure in GDP over the sample14.
The result is shown in Figure 9. Due to the negative response of output after the
announcement, the ﬁscal multiplier is negative. After two periods it is strongly rising,
14This deﬁnition is also used in Mountford and Uhlig (2008).
20becomes positive after four periods and signiﬁcantly larger than 1 after ﬁve periods.
Eventually it is decreasing again.
The second multiplier is deﬁned as the cumulative change in output divided by the
change in government consumption expenditure and scaled by the average share of
government consumption expenditure in GDP over the sample. The result is depicted
in Figure 10. The negative response of output in the beginning causes the multiplier to
not be positive until ﬁve periods after the announcement.
The share of the variance of the variables explained by the two shocks is shown in Figure
11 and Figure 12 for the business cycle and the government consumption expenditure
shock respectively. As assumed, the business cycle shock explains most of the variance
in all variables. For all variables except government expenditure this is up to 40%
with a median around 10%. The government expenditure shock explains up to 10%
of the variance during the announcement period for the variables except real wages.
Here up to 40% is explained during the impact period, but much less, below 15%, in
the following periods. After the realization of the shock, up to 20% of the variance in
output and private consumption is explained.
5.6 Comparison with other studies
To the best of my knowledge there are three studies considering the eﬀects of a pre-
announced government expenditure shock using a SVAR model approach.
The results presented in this paper are most similar to those obtained by Mertens
and Ravn (2009). In contrast to the other studies they also address the issue of the
non-invertibility of the VMA representation. Even though they do not ﬁnd qualitative
diﬀerences in the response of private consumption and output after the announcement
and the realization of a shock, they ﬁnd a very strong announcement eﬀect: both
variables increase strongly when the shock takes place. During the announcement
private consumption reacts negatively.
The results obtained are also in line with Tenhofen and Wolﬀ (2007). They consider a
one quarter announcement horizon and ﬁnd a negative response of private consumption
to a pre-announced government expenditure shock. After the shock, private consump-
tion increases steadily, but, in contrast to the result in this paper, does not become
positive.
Mountford and Uhlig (2008) consider diﬀerent policy scenarios for a four quarter an-
nouncement horizon without explicitly modeling the pre-announcement. For an an-
nounced increase in government expenditure they ﬁnd an immediate rise in private
consumption and output as the eﬀect of the announcement. Despite a more persistent
response in output and private consumption they do not ﬁnd any other announcement
eﬀects.
21Putting the results into the context of the debate between Ramey (2008) and Blan-
chard and Perotti (2002), I ﬁnd partial support for both views: while there are pre-
announcement eﬀects that cause private consumption to respond negatively during the
ﬁrst periods as pointed out by Ramey (2008), the realization of the shock leads to a
strong positive response in private consumption as found by Blanchard and Perotti
(2002).
6 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the eﬀect of a government expenditure shock on private
consumption and real wages by employing a structural VMA model. The identiﬁcation
key has been to model the pre-announcement of a government expenditure shock and
its consequences on other economic variables explicitly.
The application of this idea is not straightforward for two reasons: ﬁrst, when assuming
that policy is pre-announced, the moving average representation of the data generated
by this policy is potentially non-stable so that it cannot be approximated by a VAR
model. I have therefore estimated a VMA model directly. Second, since the restrictions
are not common knowledge I have employed a DSGE model, laid out initially by Gal´ ı,
L´ opez-Salido, and Vall´ es (2007), from which to derive the sign restrictions. The DSGE
model is well suited to the problem because it addresses the typical arguments of the
Keynesian as well as the classic view of the economy. On the one hand it features
households which cannot smooth consumption, imperfect labor markets and a certain
degree of price stickiness. How strong these features inﬂuence the result and the re-
strictions depend on its parametrization, for example the proportion of rule-of-thumb
consumers and the degree of price stickiness. In the limit, i.e. with no rule-of-thumb
consumers and ﬁrms allowed to reset prices each period, it boils down to a neoclassical
model. Therefore, as Figure 3, indicates this DSGE model allows for positive as well as
negative responses in consumption and real wages. The parametrization of the DSGE
model and the corresponding identifying assumptions for the VMA model are estimated
by matching the corresponding impulse response functions of the VMA model. Thus
the parameters of the VMA model and the DSGE model are estimated jointly.
The results for a three quarter pre-announced increase in government expenditures show
strong qualitative diﬀerences during the announcement period and after the realization
of the shock: output and hours worked respond negatively during the announcement
period and positively afterwards, investment responds negatively one additional quarter
before responding positively. Private consumption mimics this behavior and shows a
stable, slightly negative response during the announcement period followed by a signif-
icant positive response after the realization of the shock. Real wages react signiﬁcantly
positively on impact, decrease (and even become negative) during the announcement
horizon and react signiﬁcantly positively for two quarters after the realization.
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26A Appendix
A.1 Data description
The frequency of all data used is quarterly.
Real GDP: This series is BEA NIPA table 1.1.6 line 1 (A191RX1).
Nominal GDP: This is a measure of nominal GDP given by the series GDP, Gross
Domestic Product at the Federal Reserve Board of St. Louis’ website
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. It is measured in billions of dollars.
Implicit GDP Deﬂator: The implicit GDP deﬂator is calculated as the ratio of
Nominal GDP to Real GDP.
Private Consumption: Nominal consumption expenditures for non-durables and ser-
vices is the sum of the respective values of the series PCND, Personal Consump-
tion Expenditures: Nondurable Goods and PCESV, Personal Consumption Ex-
penditures: Services at the Federal Reserve Board of St. Louis’ website
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. Both series are measured in billions of dol-
lars.
Private Investment: Total real private investment is the sum of the respective values
of the series BEA NIPA table 1.1.6 line 6 (A006RX1) and PCDG, Personal Con-
sumption Expenditures: Durable Goods at the Federal Reserve Board of St. Louis’
website http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/ (billions of dollars) in real terms.
Government Expenditure: Current government expenditure is the series in BEA
NIPA table 3.1 line 15 (W022RC1).
Government Debt: The annual government debt is the historical series that can be
copied from TreasuryDirect at
http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/histdebt/histdebt.htm. The quar-
terly data is generated by a linear interpolation. The values have been converted
from dollars to billions of dollars. Note that the beginning of the ﬁscal year
changed from July 1 to October 1 in 1977.
Hours worked: This series is downloadable from the website of the Bureau of Labor
Statistics at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/srgate. The series’ identiﬁcation number
is: PRS84006033. It is an index (1992=100).
Wage: The wage rate is the series COMPNFB, Nonfarm Business Sector: Compensa-
tion Per Hour at the Federal Reserve Board of St. Louis’ website
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
A-1Government Consumption Expenditures: Government consumption expenditures
is the series BEA NIPA table 3.1 line 16 (A955RC1).
Civilian Population: This is a quarterly measure for the population given by the
respective average of the monthly values of the series CNP16OV, Civilian Non-
institutional Population at the Federal Reserve Board of St. Louis’ website
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. The numbers have been converted from
thousands to billions.
A.2 The posterior distribution of the VMA model
The conditional distribution described in this section is p(ϕV|θ,Y) from the right-hand
side of (10). It is conditional since the prior distribution for the impulse response func-
tions p(ϕV)=p(ϕV|θ) is derived from the DSGE model.15 The posterior distribution of
the structural impulse responses ϕV is obtained by combining the coeﬃcient estimates
of the reduced form VMA model Φ with an impulse matrix A.
p(ϕ
V|θ,Y)=p(A,Φ|θ,Y)J(ϕ
V → A,Φ) (A-1)
Therefore, the distribution in focus is the right-hand side of equation (A-1). The
Jacobian is derived in appendix A.2.1. The posterior distribution p(A,Φ|θ,Y) is derived
by maximizing the likelihood function p(Y |φ,A) with respect to the reduced VMA
model coeﬃcients and its variance covariance matrix Σ = A A ﬁrst16. The likelihood
is multiplied by a prior distribution containing the identifying restrictions p(A,Φ|θ)t o
yield the posterior distribution. Since the identifying restrictions are sign restrictions
they put zero prior weight on the parameter regions of Φ and A whenever the sign
restrictions are not satisﬁed.
The posterior distribution is evaluated in the following way. Denote the likelihood








where Σl is the inverse of the Hessian computed at [vec(˜ Σ) vec(˜ Φ)] . Every realization
of the vector of parameters of the DSGE model θ is associated with an impulse response
function of the DSGE model and a realization of the impulse matrix ˘ A(θ). A sequence of
realizations of θ yields a sequence of restrictions and therefore a related prior probability
distribution.
15The impulse response functions of the DSGE model deﬁne a probability distribution of impulse
response functions dependent on θ.
16See Appendix A.2.2 for a detailed description.
17vec(Σ) summarizes only the unique entries in Σ.
A-2A.2.1 Setup of the prior distribution p(ϕV|θ)
The prior distribution for the reduced form coeﬃcients of the VMA model and the
impulse matrix A conditional on restrictions derived from the DSGE model is derived in
the following steps. First, a prior distribution for ϕV given impulse response functions
of the DSGE model is formulated. The distribution is decomposed into conditional
normal distributions. The conditional normal distributions are written in terms of the
reduced form coeﬃcients and the impulse matrix. To do so, the distribution has to be
scaled by the Jacobian.
Denote the impulse response functions in period k as ϕV
k . If all shocks are included, the
matrix is of size m×m, where the entry i,j corresponds to the response of variable i to
an innovation in variable j. The prior for the impulse responses has to be speciﬁed for as
many periods as there are impulse response functions to be estimated. The vectorized























































¯ V00 ¯ V01 ¯ V02 ··· ¯ V0l
¯ V10 ¯ V11 ¯ V12 ··· ¯ V1k
¯ V20 ¯ V21 ¯ V22 ··· ¯ V2k
. . .
















The probability distribution p(ϕ0,ϕ 1,...,ϕk) can be decomposed into a marginal distri-
bution of p(ϕ0) and succeeding conditional distributions:
p(ϕ0,ϕ 1,...,ϕk)=p(ϕk|ϕk−1 ···ϕ0)p(ϕk−1|ϕk−2 ···ϕ0)···p(ϕ1|ϕ0)p(ϕ0), (A-4)
with
p(vec(ϕ0)) = N(vec(¯ ϕ0), ¯ ¯ V00) (A-5)
p(vec(ϕi|vec(ϕi−1)···vec(ϕ0)) = N(χi,Δii),i=1···k, (A-6)
and χi and Δii abbreviate the usual deﬁnitions for conditional distributions:
χi = vec(¯ ϕ)+





¯ V00 ··· ¯ V0i−1
. . . ... . . .







vec(ϕ0 − ¯ ϕ0)
. . .




Δii = ¯ Vii −





¯ V00 ··· ¯ V0i−1
. . . ... . . .













In order to write the prior distribution in terms of the reduced form coeﬃcients it is
necessary to scale the probability distribution with the Jacobian:
p(ϕ)=p(f(Φ))J(ϕ ⇒ Φ). (A-7)
A-3The relationship between structural and reduced form moving average coeﬃcients is
given by:
ϕ0 = A (A-8)
ϕi =Φ iA,i =1···k.
Note that Φ0 is omitted since this matrix is normalized to an identity matrix by as-
sumption. This also indicates that it is not possible to infer on ϕ0 from the estimated
reduced VMA model.
The Jacobian is calculated in the following way. Applying the vec-operator yields:18
vec(ϕi)=( A
  ⊗ Im×m)vec(Φi). (A-9)
The Jacobian matrix is deﬁned as:





















Due to the fact that
∂vec(ϕi)
∂vec(Φj) = 0 for j>i , the matrix becomes a block triangular matrix
and the determinant is given by:










J(ϕ → Φ) = |(A
  ⊗ Im×m)|
k = |A|
mk (A-11)
Given (A-3), its decomposition deﬁned in (A-4) and the Jacobian (A-11) a prior distri-
bution for the reduced form coeﬃcients conditional on ϕ0 = A is formulated as:
p(A,Φ1,...,Φk|θ)=p(Φk|Φk−1 ···A,θ)···p(ϕ1|A,θ)p(A|θ)J(ϕ → Φ), (A-12)
where
p(vec(A)) = N(vec(¯ ϕ0), ¯ ¯ V00) (A-13)
p(vec(Φi)|vec(Φi−1)···vec(A)) = N(¯ Φi, ¯ ¯ Vii) (A-14)
with
¯ Φi =( A
  ⊗ Im×m)θi (A-15)





The prior distribution (A-12) consists of conditional normal distributions (A-16), which
can be easily evaluated, and a non-standard distribution for the impulse matrix. The
non-standard distribution arises because (A-15) is scaled by (A-11).
18Note that vec(AB)=( I ⊗ A)vec(B)=( B  ⊗ I)vec(A))
A-4A.2.2 The likelihood for the reduced form coeﬃcients
Consider the VMA(k) process
Yt = ut +Φ 1ut−1 +Φ 2ut−2 + ···+Φ kut−k. (A-17)
This can be written in state space form:
ξt+1 = Fξ t + Ut+1 (A-18)
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Im Φ1 ··· Φk
 
m∗×m∗k
Given an initial condition for y0 and Σ0 the likelihood can then be written as:
p(yT,...,y 0|Φ1,...,Φk,Σ) = p(yT|yT−1 ...y 0,Φ1,...,Φk,Σ)···p(y0|Φ1,...,Φk,Σ),
(A-20)
where:
p(yt|yt−1 ...y 0,Φ1,...,Φk)=N(yt|t−1,Σt|t−1) (A-21)
and yt|t−1 and Σt|t−1 denote the optimal forecast at time t, which is a function of
the coeﬃcient matrices. The impulse matrix A is not part of the likelihood function;
instead, the variance covariance matrix Σ = A A.
A.3 The conditional distribution of the DSGE model param-
eters
Since the DSGE model is not assumed to be a proper representation of the data gen-
erating process, the structural parameters are not estimated by matching the data Y .
Instead, the DSGE model is assumed to replicate the implied dynamics of the data,
i.e. the impulse response functions of the VAR model. This induces matching a given













j (˜ θ)+ωj, (A-23)
with all vectors of dimension m∗K ×1. The error term ωi has the property E[ωiω 
i]=
Ωωi, which was part of the vector θ. Since the structural shocks are assumed to be















The vector θ is estimated in two steps: ﬁrst Ωωi is estimated, and afterwards the vector






i (˜ θ). (A-25)
For every realization of ϕV
i a reasonable number of draws from p(θ) are taken, and the
corresponding impulse response function ϕD
i (˜ θ) and the error terms are computed. ˜ Ωωi

























˜ Ωωi ⊗ IK
 −1
(ωi). (A-26)
Combining this likelihood with a prior distribution for θ yields a posterior distribution.
A.4 Sampling algorithm
In order to evaluate the joint posterior distribution of the parameters of the DSGE
model and the VAR model I use a Gibbs sampling algorithm combined with a Metropolis-
Hastings step. The Gibbs sampling algorithm allows me to draw from the conditional
distributions laid out in detail in sections ?? and A.3. The Metropolis-Hastings step
is an acceptance/rejection sampling algorithm that determines the probability space
where the implied impulse response functions of the DSGE model and those of the
VAR model coincide. It is carried out 20 times.
To initialize the algorithm, candidate distributions for the conditional distributions
p(ϕV|θ,Y) and p(θ|ϕV) are derived for j =1...d:
1. Draw a θj from p(θ).
A-62. For every realization of the vector of deep parameters of the DSGE model derive
the corresponding sign restriction.
3. Draw a Φ from vec(Φ) ∼N (vec(˜ Φ), ˜ ΣΦ) and an orthonormal matrix Q so that
ϕV satisﬁes the restrictions derived from ϕD.
4. For every realization of ϕV derived from step 3 ﬁnd the θ that maximizes (A-26)
combined with the prior p(θ).
5. Repeat this d times.
The d vectors of deep structural parameters deﬁne the candidate distribution p(θ|ϕV)c
and a corresponding distribution of p(ϕV|θ)c for the following algorithm. At each
iteration i =1 ,...,I conduct the following steps:
1. Draw n times from p(θ|ϕV)c.
2. For every realization of the vector of deep parameters of the DSGE model derive
the corresponding sign restrictions.
3. Given the sign restrictions, draw a Φ from vec(Φ) ∼N(vec(˜ Φ), ˜ ΣΦ). Compute the
lower Cholesky decomposition and ﬁnd an ˘ A = ˜ AQ fulﬁlling the sign restrictions
in 2. Compute the corresponding ϕV, yielding p(ϕV|θ)
˜ i.
4. For every realization of ϕV derived from step 3 ﬁnd the θ that maximizes (A-26)
combined with the prior p(θ). This yields p(θ|ϕV)
˜ i.
5. Carry out acceptance-rejection by comparing p(θ|ϕV)
˜ i with p(θ|ϕV)i−1. Keep the
corresponding vectors from p(ϕV|θ)
˜ i. This yields p(θ|ϕV)i−1 and p(ϕV|θ)i.
6. Start again at 1.
The chain converges if p(θ|ϕV)i and p(θ|ϕV)i−1 and also p(ϕV|θ)i and p(ϕV|θ)i−1 are
similar, i.e. the acceptance rate is low. It is important to note that the candidate
p(θ|ϕV)c is not adjusting over the algorithm in order to avoid the algorithm becoming
stuck and to allow for a continuous wide range of the parameters of the DSGE model.
Thus, d should be chosen high enough. I chose d = 200.
A.5 Kalman Filter and root-ﬂipping
This section provides insights into how the Kalman Filter ﬂips the roots of a non-stable
process similar to a Blaschke factor and therefore recovers the correct econometric
A-7estimates. The calculations and the example in this section are mostly taken from
slides by Eric Leeper19.
To keep this section self-explanatory, I ﬁrst set out brieﬂy the DSGE model used as
an example. The DSGE model, as in Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2008), is a standard
growth model with log preferences, inelastic labor supply, and complete depreciation













where βg is the discount factor, αg the share of capital in the production function and
ag an exogenous technology shock. The government sets taxes according to:
tg,t = τg,tvg,t.
After log linearizing the system of equations, the equilibrium is characterized by a
second-order diﬀerence equation in capital, which is solved by
ˆ kg,t = αgˆ kg,t−1 +ˆ ag,t − (1 − θg)
 
¯ τg
1 − ¯ τg





where θg = αgβg(1 − ¯ τg). In a DSGE model with pre-announced taxes the tax rate ˆ τt
is a function of news shocks  g,τ,t−q, where q denotes the pre-announcement horizon.





.F o rq = 2 (A-27) can be written as:
ˆ kg,t = αgˆ kg,t−1 +ˆ ag,t − κg ( g,τ,t−1 + θ g,τ,t), (A-28)
equation (A-28) can be written as
(1 − αgL)ˆ kg,t = −κg(L + θg) g,τ,t.
Invertibility of this stochastic process requires |θg| > 1, which is not the case. One way
to achieve invertibility is to employ a Blaschke factor 20 (L + θg)/(1 + θgL). Deﬁne a
new error term   
g,τ,t =( L + θg)/(1 + θgL) g,τ,t. Then,
(1 − αgL)ˆ kg,t = −κ(L + θg)
(1 + θgL)
(L + θg)
(L + θg)/(1 + θgL) g,τ,t
(1 − αgL)ˆ kg,t = −κ(1 + θgL) 
 
g,τ,t
(1 − αgL)ˆ kg,t = −(1 − θ)
 
¯ τg










19From ZEI summer school 2008.
20See Lippi and Reichlin (1993), Lippi and Reichlin (1994) and Mertens and Ravn (2009) for further
information.
A-8Equation (A-29) is now an invertible stochastic process for |θg| < 1.
Another way to achieve invertibility is to write equation (A-28) as a state space system
in the innovation representation:
xg,t+1 = Agxg,t + Kgag,t
yg,t = Cgxg,t + ag,t,
with xg,t = −(κgθg)−1ˆ kg,t −  g,τ,t, yg,t = −(κgθg)−1ˆ kg,t, ag,t =  g,τ,t−1, Ag = αg, Cg =1
and Kg =( αg + θ−1
g ). The condition for invertibility of the system is found by using
ag,t = yg,t − Cgxg,t and rewriting the state space system as:
xg,t+1 =( Ag − CgKg)xg,t + Kgyg,t
ag,t = yg,t − Cgxg,t.
The system is stable if the eigenvalues of (Ag − CgKg) are inside the unit circle. Since
Ag − CgKg = αg − αg − θ−1
g = −θ−1
g and θ−1
g > 1, the system is not stable. But, it
can be shown that there exists a Kg so that the system is stable. This involves the
following assumptions concerning time invariance of the Kalman Filter:
1. The pair (A 
g,C 
g) is stabilizable. A pair (A 
g,C 
g) is stabilizable if y 
gCg = 0 and
y 
gAg = λgy 
g for some complex number λg and some complex vector yg implies
that |λg| < 1o ryg =0 .
2. The pair (Ag,G g) is detectable. The pair (Ag,G g) is detectable if G 
gyg = 0 and
Agyg = λgyg for some complex number λg and some complex vector yg implies
that |λg| < 1o ryg =0 .
Both assumptions are fulﬁlled for the process and the conditions yield αg = λg or y =0 .
The Riccati equation for the covariance matrix of the innovation ag,t can be solved for







which yields a corresponding Kalman gain:
Kg = αg + θg
The condition for stability now reads Ag − KgCg = −θg. Since |θg| < 1 the process is
now invertible.
A.6 Loglinearized Equations of the DSGE model





t+1 − ˆ Rt +ˆ πt+1 (A-30)




t +( 1− β(1 − δ)) ˆ R
k
t+1 + βˆ qt+1 (A-31)
ˆ i
o
t − ˆ k
o
t−1 = ηˆ qt (A-32)
ˆ k
o
t =( 1− δ)ˆ k
o










(ˆ wt +ˆ nt) −
¯ tr
¯ c
(φbˆ bt−1 + φgˆ gt) (A-34)
ˆ ct + ϕˆ nt =ˆ wt (A-35)
ˆ ct = λˆ c
r
t +( 1− λ)ˆ c
o
t (A-36)
ˆ kt = ˆ k
o
t (A-37)
ˆ it =ˆ i
o
t (A-38)











ˆ πt = βEt[ˆ πt+1] − λp ˆ mct (A-41)
ˆ mct =ˆ yt − ˆ nt − ˆ wt (A-42)
ˆ R
k






















ˆ Rt = φπˆ πt (A-45)
ˆ gt = ρgˆ gt−1 +  g,t−3 (A-46)
A.7 Tables and Figures
Table 1: Prior and posterior distribution of the structural parameters of the DSGE
model
Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Parameter distribution mean std mean std
ρg beta 0.8 0.1 0.74 0.02
φg gamma 0.1 0.1 0.08 0.01
φb gamma 0.33 0.1 0.32 0.02
λ beta 0.4 0.1 0.36 0.02
ϑ beta 0.7 0.15 0.74 0.03
η normal 7 5 4.2 0.81
ν gamma 0.2 0.1 0.14 0.01
σg invgamma 0.02 0.026 0.01 0.001




































Figure 1: Government expenditure shock two periods preannounced DSGE model cal-
ibrated to redo Ramey
















































































































Figure 2: Result Monte Carlo Experiment

















































































































































































Figure 3: Impulse response function from prior distribution of the DSGE model. All















































Real debt   
Figure 4: Data (blue) vs. likelihood estimates VMA (green)














































































































































































Figure 5: Impulse Responses after a pre-announced increase in government expendi-
tures. Pre-announcement three quarters. (68% probability bands)
















































































































































































Figure 6: Impulse Responses of the DSGE model (dashed) and the VMA model after a
pre-announced increase in government expenditures. Pre-announcement three quarters.
(68% probability bands)


























































Figure 7: Prior (white) vs. Posterior (black) distribution of the DSGE model with 3
quarters pre-announcement.



























































Figure 8: Impulse responses of the nominal interest rate and inﬂation in the DSGE
model to a government expenditure shock with 3 quarters pre-announcement.











Figure 9: Fiscal multiplier deﬁned as fm=(response of gdp/change in government con-
sumption expenditures)/average share of government consumption expenditures in gdp.
68% probability bands.









Figure 10: Fiscal multiplier deﬁned as fm=(cumulative response of gdp/change in gov-
ernment consumption expenditures)/average share of government consumption expen-
ditures in gdp. 68% probability bands.



















































































































































































































Figure 11: Variance decomposition: Business cycle shock. 68% probability bands.




















































































































































































































Figure 12: Variance decomposition: Government expenditure shock. 68% probability
bands.
23